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Abstract: This article intends to provide responses to some of the many unanswered questions 
about the making and the transformation of the uprising in Syria by exploring a new avenue of 
research: media development aid. Most of the academic interest has been oriented towards the role 
that the new media played at the time of the uprising, insufficient interest, instead, has been directed 
to the development of the sector in the years predating it. What emerges from this article is that the 
Syrian media landscape was strongly supported by international development aid during the years 
prior the outbreak of the uprising of 2011. By looking at the complex structure of media aid 
architecture and investigating into the practices and programs implemented by some representative 
organisations, this article reflects on the field of media development as a new modus operandi of the 
West (EU and US especially), to promote democracy through alternative and non-collateral bottom-
up support. 
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Nearly six years have passed since the political uprising that swept through many Arab 
countries began. Syria was caught in the grip of this revolutionary moment, one that drove the 
country to a civil war with no apparent way out. Analysts advanced a number of theoretical 
explanations for this event, which included the demographic profile of the young generations and 
the economic difficulties they experienced, corruption of the government, the use of techniques from 
successful campaigns and the coordination of dissent through traditional/offline and new/online 
forms of contention. The employment of the new media by anti and pro-government groups have 
reached an unthinkable scale, to the point that the media have become instruments not limited to 
the purpose of informing, planning and coordinating the protest, but ‘performing’ in the conflict, 
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exacerbating the fight, instilling fear in the enemy and intimidating the adversary, while proselyting. 
By going beyond the dichotomy that frames the media as a deus ex-machina of the uprising or 
conversely, as a means of its expression, this paper attempts to draw attention on the leverage and 
role that West’s media aid assistance had in fostering popular mobilization in Syria and to many 
extents, the rest of the region.  Indeed, within the greater debate around the roots of what has been 
called the ‘Arab Spring’, very little attention has indeed been given to the change of the media scene 
in the years that predated the outbreak of the uprising and in specific to the role of international aid 
assistance to the media sector.  
The phenomenon of media aid industry in Syria as much as in other geographical contexts has 
never generated extensive academic interests. Interestingly, if literature on media development can 
be defined as nascent at its very best, its practice marked what has been Western foreign policy 
programs since the second War World (Colle, 2002).1 Communication and information technologies 
have always been considered having beneficial effects on democracy promotion and economic 
development of developing countries, based on the assumption that the more citizens are 
empowered to make informed choices, the better the media serve democracy (Sakr, 2004).2 
However, foreign aid investment in the media sector has seen a visible investment in the past decade 
given the potentials that the new information and communication technologies of the last generation 
seem to offer in terms of interrupting the state’s monopoly over the means of information and 
offering citizens’ empowerment in contexts unfavourable to democratic values (Hoffer, 2002).3 This 
type of Western support has proved pivotal in mobilising populations to overthrow repressive 
regimes in Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine and Lebanon, only to mention a few (Kumar, 2006).4 Today 
Western governments are investing huge sums in media projects in Arab countries, to the point that, 
as Bruce Stanely holds, such intervention has become an industry (Stanely, 2007).5 In this regard, 
not enough rigorous research and scholarship exists about the integration of new media and 
information assistance by development actors (EU countries and US) as part of their democracy 
promotion programmes implemented in perspective democracies. This type of analysis is, to a great-
extent, inexistent concerning the Middle East, despite the added value it would offer to the 
understanding of the causes that brought to the turbulent events of 2011.  
By looking at the media aid architecture in Syria, this paper investigates into the role and praxis 
of a number of donors and contractors that intervened in the country. The article consists of two 
parts. The first, more descriptive, intends at framing the concept of media development within the 
wider literature and understanding the way it has been implemented in other historical periods and 
geographical frameworks. The second part, more analytical, focuses on Syria’s media aid 
architecture, the actors involved, the projects that have been implemented and the impact this 
mechanism produces on a rather closed society like Syria. Ultimately, the chapter attempts to locate 
this issue within the broader and unfinished debate about the role and effects of international 
assistance in fragile contexts where humanitarianism and development are not simply conveying 
international altruism but at times favouring political ends. 
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1. Defining Media development 
Before getting into the analysis of the media aid industry in pre-revolutionary Syria, it would 
be appropriate to dwell on the concept and significance of media development. The Centre for 
International Media Assistance (CIMA) refers to the term ‘media development’ to indicate the efforts 
by organisations, people and governments to develop the capacity and quality of the media sector 
within a specific country or region.6  The actors engaged in this field can range from governments, to 
multilateral organisations and large number of national and international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs). In general, these actors are classified in two categories: donors, referring to 
those who provide funding and intermediaries, indicating those organisations that design and 
implement projects, often in cooperation with local partners in the recipient country. 
As earlier mentioned, in the past 20 years, the expenditure in media development assistance 
by Western agencies has skyrocketed, reaching an estimated $ 645 million in 2010 (Nelson, Pena, 
2012).7 The increase investment in the sector has occurred in concomitance or as an effect of the 
emergence of the new media technologies, which have proved meeting the needs and requests of 
international actors better than what had been with traditional ones. The promotion of free and 
independent media around the world takes many forms: journalist training and education; 
improving the legal environment for media; funding new media outlets or improving existing ones; 
media literacy training, digital and cyber-security training; infrastructure development.8 
Media development projects are often difficult to investigate as organizations supporting 
media projects very often do not have a separate office or division in charge of media development 
portfolio, including media assistance under broader headings, such as ‘democracy and governance’, 
‘capacity building’, ‘human rights’ or ‘civil society’ (i.e. European Commission). In the words of Eric 
Newton, senior adviser at the Knight Foundation,  supporting media assistance aid is far more 
important than supporting a vaccination’s campaign, as ‘you can’t get the vaccine in someone’s 
mouth until you get in that someone’s head the idea that the vaccine is good for you’ (Moller, 2009).9 
Therefore, funding media projects becomes a means to face the problem from its roots, by creating 
the conditions for the solution of the problem from within, with no direct external intervention, at 
least not formally. When applied to developing countries with non-democratic institutions, the 
promotion of media literacy acts as a tool to make better informed citizens, who can pressure 
governments to become accountable and to uproot corruption. Under these conditions, media 
development becomes a means soft power, according to Nye’s definition as the ability to attract and 
co-opt rather than coerce, as a means of persuasion, through intangible means like culture, values 
and institutions of politics.10  
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1.2 Media development assistance in the Middle East 
The West’s promotion of media development assistance in the Middle East is not a newly 
adopted policy but a concept, albeit differently, that dates back to the Cold War era, when the Middle 
East had been transformed into a confrontational battle ground between the United States and the 
USSR, a reality (alas!) not that far from the present time. The two superpowers were fighting to win 
the hearts and the minds of the ‘new nations’ of the postcolonial world by providing them with 
modernisation projects (Shah, 2011).11 Both states mostly adopted two tactics: the provision of 
development aid and the competition of the airwaves: Radio Moscow versus Voice of America (VOA). 
To ensure greater success, in 1949 VOA commissioned an empirical research to be conducted in 
Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Iran on people’s radio-listening habits (Matar, Bessaiso 2012).12 
The paradigm of ‘communications and development’ was first enounced in this research and then 
extensively explained by one of the researchers Daniel Lerner, in his contentious volume The Passing 
of Traditional Society (1958).13 The book, ingrained in an Orientalist approach, developed the idea 
of employing the media to ‘modernising’ societies through a top-down or more accurately ‘outside-
in’ approach. Despite the numerous critiques in the academic community towards the ‘patriarchal, 
xenophobic and simplistic character’ of this model of social change, de facto, this model still persists 
in Western (US and EU) development discourse.14 The geopolitical controversies of the Cold War 
and post-Cold War period, the industrialised ‘North’ and the developing ‘South’ found place in the 
concept of a ‘new world information and communication order’, intended to set a frame on the 
media’s role in society and the world at large (Mosco, 2009).15  
Yet its idea carried over to the new millennium, embedded in the agenda of Western politics 
towards the Middle East. Indeed, in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the growing 
concern of the international community of the alarm represented by ‘fragile states’, democracy 
assistance received new incentive as a means of the international community to counterbalance the 
threat and push for democratic transitions. Military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq had once 
again, proved unsuccessful and what was worse, counterproductive, nourishing more hatred towards 
the West and favouring the increase of terrorism (Sakr, 2006).16 Therefore, the international 
community became more aware of the need to develop new strategies of democracy promotion, 
which could engage and build partnership with non-governmental Arab groups and local citizens 
and build links across Middle Eastern countries.17  
Today the two largest providers of democracy assistance are the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the European Commission (EC).18 The principal areas of 
democracy building that the West has been engaging with in the Middle East are elections and 
electoral processes; political parties; judicial reforms; civil society and the media. At the core of these 
programmes, there is a common intent to raise people’s communication and information literacy, 
which are considered to be at the base of any regime change. 
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2. Syria’s Media Aid Architecture 
Looking at the media aid industry in Syria, opens a new avenue to the study of the role and 
purpose of media assistance programs in a country that witnessed a wide-scale popular uprising in 
2011 and which heavily relied on the use of new media. This article examines the impact of media 
assistance projects in Syria under the presidency of Bashar al-Asad, which coincided with a period 
of great changes for Syria, given the reforms carried out by the new president, the new agreements 
signed with foreign countries, the establishment of a private sector, the spread of satellite dishes and 
Internet connections and, most importantly, a population of young people, increasingly educated 
and yet underemployed who could become fruitful resources in whom to invest.19 This dynamic and 
yet vulnerable political system, created the right conditions for foreign investment in the media 
sector, with the intent of raising the country’s media literacy and empower local civil society actors.  
According to the Directory of Development Organizations, in 2011 a total of 107 development 
organisations operated in Syria, consisting of international organizations, government institutions, 
private sector support organisations (including fair-trade), finance institutions, training and 
research centres, civil society organisations, developing consulting firms and information providers. 
However, the actual number of actors involved in development programmes was higher, given the 
often-unofficial way to operate that many organisations adopted in the Syrian context. For instance, 
media development programmes have often opted for non-government approved ways to perform 
in Syria, on the basis that the field of operation was too sensitive and risky. Despite the openings that 
the newly elected president Bashar al-Asad promoted at the start of his presidency, the regime kept 
a strict control both over foreign funding and over organisations working in the development sector. 
The main tactic adopted by the regime to control the work of civil society organisations was to 
perform as principal promoter and funder of these organisations, a cunning expedient to reinvigorate 
the regime’s image abroad and at home, while also guaranteeing monitoring of these organisations’ 
activities. In these circumstances, donors had two possible options to operate in Syria: one official, 
with the regime’s approval and one unofficial, more difficult to realise, which consisted in having to 
operate underground, on-line or by training Syrians abroad (Taki, 2012).20  
The aid structure through which media development programmes are put in place is a complex 
mechanism that varies according to the specific case. A simplified version (Figure 1) of this structure 
would be organised in terms of structure and level of participation (Price, Noll, De Luce, 2002).21  
In this graphic, the flow of funds comes from donors (rich governments or individuals), it then 
reaches agencies (multilateral institutions), and it is at this point funnelled to the recipient country 
through the implementers (NGOs, local partners, etc.).22 The standard map includes donors and 
donees, governments, quasi-governmental organisations and NGOs, funders, intermediaries, local 
partners. Some actors participate in more than one stage. 
6 
 
This scheme is only partially respected, as there are numerous private sector groups engaged 
in aid, both as donors and as implementers of non-governmental organisations. In addition, if the 
recipient country is an authoritarian state, as in the case of Syria, it may hamper activities that appear 
politicised or viewed as jeopardising its stability. In this case, some organisations resort to a ploy to 
dupe the regime’s restrictions, by working behind the backs of governments, implementing projects 
underground, on-line or working with citizens (Syrian diaspora) outside their national borders. 
 
 
 
2.2 Donors 
The analysis of Syria’s media aid architecture might not exactly appear intriguing if it is limited to 
presenting the profile of specific actors, without examining the projects funded and with them, the 
effects they produce. For this reason, this paper opts to limit the analysis to the two main donors 
involved in Syria’s media aid architecture, underlining the specific area of competence and operation, 
while leaving more space to the analysis of the projects implemented by a number of organisations 
in the years under study.  
Support for independent media is the main field of action of the European Commission (EC) 
and the US Agency for International Development (USAID). Both agencies are famously known for 
the byzantine and often intricate, if not obscure structure of their organisation, which makes at times 
very difficult any attempt to track specific projects or funding. Media development projects are 
particularly difficult to track, as they are scattered across different sectors and funding instruments. 
It is rather emblematic that media aid programmes, which are aimed at enhancing freedom of 
expression and transparency, are at times so obscure and secretive.  
The EC and USAID have implemented media assistance programmes directed at developing 
independent press and broadcasting, strengthening the professionalization of media producers and 
outlets, supporting reform of the media legislation, establishing networks of information and inter-
regional exchange of information on human rights. However, the media sector has not been the main 
recipient of assistance or the target of development programmes, but rather the vehicle to achieve 
far-reaching goals such as to increase citizens’ participation in politics, strengthen the respect of 
human rights and democratise institutions. In fact, media development projects fall under the voice 
of broader sectors such as ‘social development and democratisation’, ‘civil society’, ‘human rights 
and democracy’. Interestingly, both organisations have increased their investment in media 
assistance programmes, with a noticeable shift towards the Middle East in the past decade. In 
particular, USAID has a long history of investing in media assistance programmes, with a focus on 
Latin American countries in the 1980s, which has then shifted to Eastern Europe and Eurasia after 
the fall of the Berlin Wall, and that has ultimately reached the Middle East in the past decade (Price, 
Noll, De Luce, 2002).23  
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The EU’s instrument regulating economic and financial cooperation with Europe’s fringes, in 
North Africa and the Middle East, is the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI), which for the period 2007-2013, was assigned 12 billion Euros. Raniero Leto, EU functionary 
for the Directorate General of Develoment and Cooperation, argues that media assistance 
programmes in Syria were aimed at the production, broadcasting and distribution of new and 
existing television and radio programmes and the distribution of Internet-based media products; 
training programmes provided by the European Neighbourhood Journalism network; establishing 
of online networks between media producers; producing of audio-visual products promoting 
intercultural dialogue.24  
Similarly, USAID’s assistance projects, including media development, are implemented under 
four main regional departments: Africa, Latin American and the Caribbean, Europe and Eurasia, and 
Asia Near East. Hence, media development programmes are supported through the specific 
geographical department, as well as by other channels, like the State Department Bureaus. USAID’s 
spending on media development in the Middle East shot up in 2008 from $ 1 million to more than $ 
42 million in a single year (Cary, D’Amour, 2013).25 In Syria, given the restrictions imposed by the 
regime and the not ideal relations with the US administration before 2011, USAID has only been able 
to intervene indirectly through programmes supporting nascent civil society groups and actors that 
promoted independent media by providing training, overseas travel grants and scholarships to local 
civil society actors. Among the numerous governmental instruments designed by the State 
Department to fund grassroots and bottom-up initiatives of civil society groups in the Middle East 
and North Africa, one should mention the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI).26 The name of 
the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) was recently linked to Syria with the release of the 
WikiLeaks’ cables on US secret backing of Syrian opposition groups before the outbreak of the 
uprising in 2011 (Whitlock, 2011).27 According to the released documents, the MEPI was transformed 
into the main channel to destabilise the Syrian regime under the name of civil society support 
programmes. While Edgar Vasquez, a State Department spokesperson, said that MEPI had allocated 
USD 7.5 million for Syrian programmes since 2005, the WikiLeaks cable pegged a higher amount of 
USD 12 million between 2005 and 2010. In particular, the cable held that US funding had been 
allocated to start up an anti-Assad satellite channel, Barada TV. Barada TV’s director, Malik al-
Abdeh, whom I interviewed, denied any affiliation to US funding, though he declined to share the 
names of those independent Syrian businesspersons who, he held, had sponsored the channel.28 The 
24 hours channel, not on-air anymore, became very popular among the Syrian regime opposition 
viewers, with its shows, like ‘Toward change’ – a panel discussion on current events –, and ‘First 
Step’ – a programme produced by Syrian dissident group based in the US – progressively becoming 
reference for many antagonists of the regime. 
 
 
2.3. Contractors 
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2.3.1. BBC Media Action 
 
The BBC Media Action represents an important player in the field of media development in 
Syria. Despite the high level of competence and successful history of international media assistance, 
Syria has not been an easy ground to work, given the regime’s tight supervision and the suspicion 
overlooking any foreign activity.  
The BBC Media Action has been among the pioneer organisations implementing media 
assistance programmes in Syria. Juliette Harkin, BBC journalist and specialist of Syrian media, 
affirmed in our first interview that Syria was selected, among other seven Middle Eastern countries, 
for a £ 1.5 million package project between 2004 and 2007.29 The project, Arab Media Dialogue 
programme, consisted in building partnerships with Arab media organisations and training 
management and staff of media agencies.30 Harkin, project manager of the programme and based in 
Damascus at the time, said that the programme in Syria consisted in the organisation of trainings in 
journalism skills, business and management for selected journalists, editors and managers, working 
in partnership with both state and private media outlets.  
In 2006, the BBC directed its support to a newly-created private online newspaper, Syria 
News, by training its managers on sustainable business models for online news and by organising 
tailored BBC-run workshops for seven of its staff. Part of the team was selected to take part in 
business development training and in study courses in London. In turn, Syria News became a role 
model in the field of professional media outlet in Syria, working with high international journalistic 
standards that provided practical training scholarships and materials to graduate students from the 
journalism department at Damascus University. This means that the training acquired in the first 
place by the BBC Media Action was then transferred to the Syria News staff and to the graduate 
students in journalism who underwent a stage at the newspaper headquarters.  
Of a different nature was the three-year project ‘Socially Responsible Media Platforms in the 
Arab World’ that the BBC launched in 2008, with the aim of setting up an interactive online training 
platform for Syrian journalists and bloggers. The project, the Ara2 (in Arabic for ‘opinions’) 
Academy, directed by Maha Taki, was thought of as a tool capable of bridging this gap and making 
the Syrian bloggers and journalists’ community stronger. Based on the already existing BBC on-line 
media training model, though targeting the whole Arab world, the Ara2 Academy became an on-line 
training platform, in Arabic, targeting only Syrian journalists and bloggers. Taki sustained that, 
under president Bashar, both journalists and bloggers had tried to make small changes by opening 
news spaces on-line, whether in the form of a magazine or of a blog, but with no attempt at 
connecting these two worlds, which remained completely separate. Conversely, the Ara2 Academy 
tried to create a link between these two worlds, bring them closer, make them know each other and 
make them interact. The project developed through two courses, ‘Basic Journalism Skills’ and ‘Social 
Media Tools’, based on basic journalists and bloggers’ skills like how to open a blog, how to upload 
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videos, how to interact, how to write news pieces, how to use Twitter and other aggregators. By doing 
so, bloggers and journalists would learn each other’s skills and fields of competence and interact in 
the production of news. With no official advertisement of the course, the programme managed to 
train, by word of mouth, over 75 men and women among whom there were journalists, bloggers and 
web masters before the worsening of the political situation in 2011, which led to an inevitable freeze 
of all development aid.31 For this reason, many NGOs have preferred to train journalists rather than 
build local institutions, which requires overcoming more obstacles, like the regime control or 
justifying their presence in the country. 
The deteriorating reality in Syria, with a popular uprising turning into a civil conflict, obliged 
many international organisations to freeze their programmes. This was the case for the BBC Media 
Action, which with the increase of violence in Syria, decided to step aside for some time, feeling, in 
the words of Taki, very nervous of any involvement in such circumstances. When it became clear that 
the Syrian conflict was far from ending anytime soon, the BBC Media Action decided to change the 
nature of its projects, the targets and the location of its trainings. This means that media assistance 
projects have tried to meet the information needs of the refugees inside and outside refugee camps, 
offer practical advice and restore values of peace and solidarity forgotten during the conflict.32  
 
 
2.3.2. The Institute for War and Peace Reporting 
The Institute for War and Peace Reporting (IWPR) is one of the main institutions involved in 
media development, working in frontlines, crises and transition areas around the world. IWPR has 
a long and varied experience across the world, having started its mandate in the Middle East after 
the war in Iraq of 2003. 
According to the manager of IWPR’s MENA programme Susanne Fischer, interviewed in 
Beirut, their strategy in Syria has been, in primis, to educate a new generation of journalists.33 ‘The 
University curricula (the national one) had nothing to do with what we, the West, meant for 
journalism’, held Fischer. Decades of authoritarian ruling had transformed the field of journalism 
into an extension of the ministry of information and journalists into state’s functionaries.34 IWPR 
was one of the few organisations, like BBC and Deutche Welle, which started working in Syria long 
before the outbreak of the uprising in 2011, with the intent of nourishing young journalists with new 
values and skills. Conversely to the modus operandi of BBC and Deutche Welle, which operated with 
the state’s approval, IWPR worked undercover. In both cases, meaning working with and without 
state’s authorization had its limits. In fact, having to work undercover requires more time for projects 
to take off, for networks to be created and mostly to gain people’s trust; while working under the 
state’s authorisation means less freedom in programmes’ planning.  
The organisation became officially active in the country in 2007, when it hosted a first round 
of media training in Istanbul. The training was offered to journalists and media activists belonging 
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to three different groups: a Kurdish group, a group in opposition to the regime and a mixed one 
(ethnically and politically speaking). These first trainings, Fischer asserted, were a primary way to 
assess the general media literacy level in Syria, draw a profile of Syrian journalists-activists and tailor 
future trainings according to their specific needs. From 2008, IWPR became operative in Syria, 
working with a local partner, the Syrian International Academy for Training and Development (SIA), 
which became the basis for their practical trainings.35 The Syrian International Academy was a 
Damascus-based institution, which offered specialised training and development in the fields of 
Media, Public Relations and International Affairs and Diplomatic studies. In particular, the 
Department for Media Training employed elite experts, specialists and trainers from partners like 
Al-Jazeera Media Training Centre in Qatar and Radio Monte Carlo, providing well-equipped 
facilities which suited any media courses and activities. IWPR’s MENA manager, had found in the 
director of the Syrian Academy, a private institute, an open-minded person, willing to offer new 
curricula to Syrian journalists, even if this might not always coincide with the regime’s views.  
The trainings organised by IWPR were not a one-day shot, but intensive one-week or more 
training sessions. They would not finish on the last day of the training, on the contrary ‘the actual 
training would start at the end, when the trainees made their first steps as media professionals, 
shadowed by their trainers’. This meant that IWPR’s trainings persisted over time, with a mentoring 
that continued at distance. For this purpose, IWPR established two news website, The Damascus 
Bureau and CyberArabs, to assist their trainees beyond the training. The Damascus Bureau was 
thought of as an open window to Syrian issues and beyond, tackling prominent political, economic 
and cultural news. Rather than covering breaking news, the website presents in-depth coverage of 
issues related to civil society, refugees, human rights, justice and more recently the dire reality of the 
Syrian conflict.36 The CyberArabs website instead addresses a wider audience, targeting issues of 
cyber security and delivering up-to date information on the latest digital security threats.37 In 2010, 
the regime imposed strict surveillance on suspicious activities, limiting progressively the operational 
activity of organisations like IWPR. Under the ultimatum of the regime, IWPR decided to re-locate 
to Beirut and set up its trainings from there. According to Fischer, the regime had been aware of their 
activities before 2010, but it somehow tolerated their presence, seen as non-hazardous. Indeed, most 
of the articles that the trainees wrote had been intentionally uploaded on-line in English (whether 
they were written in English in the first place or translated afterwards), in order to draw less attention 
and fuel less hatred from the government. Despite this shrewdness, the often politicised stances that 
some of the articles acquired, especially when covering human rights issues, made the government 
issue a clear and definitive red light signal. 
IWPR had a dominant role in the field of media development in pre-revolutionary Syria. Media 
trainings ranged from classes on basic journalism, print and on-line journalism, as well as video 
journalism; they became increasingly sophisticated and tailored with the advancement of the 
programmes and with groups that were called for a second round. The organisation trained around 
80 Syrian journalists between 2007 and 2010, with a selection of profiles that were not specifically 
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media-related, but who came from different occupations, though all motivated to learn how to use 
the new media. 
Since the outbreak of the uprising, IWPR has been very cautious with its operation, relocating 
all the trainings to Lebanon (Beirut), Turkey (Istanbul and Gaziantep)and only recently in the Syria’s 
liberated areas. 
 
 
2.3.3. Arab Reports for Investigative Journalism 
Arab Reporters for Investigative Journalism (ARIJ) is the first and only non-profit 
organisation in the region dedicated to promoting investigative journalism. The Amman-based 
organization was established in 2005 to support ‘independent quality professional journalism, 
through in-depth journalism projects, and offering media coaching.’38 The organisation has been 
working in the field of print, radio, TV and on-line media in Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Iraq, 
Bahrain, Palestine, Yemen and Tunisia. ARIJ was set up as the outcome of a number meetings held 
by Arab journalists, editors, media activists and professions who came together, committed to 
enhance the quality of Arab journalism.39 The main line of the organisation is to train journalists in 
investigative journalism and support their specific investigative reports, funding their travel costs, 
access to national and international databases, translate their reports and what is more providing 
legal support if action is taken against a journalists. 
Saad Hattar, head of the Investigative Reporting Department at ARIJ, with more than 20 years 
of experience as a media trainer, taught media trainings to more than 1,200 journalists in the region, 
of which around 150 Syrians since its opening.40 ARIJ, explained Hattar, had been working in Syria 
in an official way, the only way, he held, to work effectively in Syria, without jeopardising those 
participating. By having the regime’s consent, ARIJ has been able to offer trainings to both private 
and state-sector journalists through their offices in Damascus and Aleppo, with some fieldtrips to 
their headquarters in Amman. ARIJ has been able to gain the regime’s blessing in the name of the 
new type of journalism that it promotes, investigative reporting, presented to the Syrian government 
as an experimental field that, albeit not encompassing political issues, it can support the government 
with keeping track of cases of social mismanagement and corruption. Nonetheless, Hattar admits 
that given the often weak professional profile of some of their Syrian journalists, ARIJ has actually 
carried out trainings that were not focused only on investigative reporting but they more broadly 
encompassed more general knowledge on how to write a news story, how to use online databases to 
dig for accurate information and how to make use of social-media and how to produce video 
reporting.  
The legal support offered by the organisation constitutes a precious factor for many journalists 
in Syria, who have this far been strongly limited by a mechanism of self-censorship, fearing to 
overstep redlines. Rana Sabbagh-Gargour, ARIJ executive director, stressed that ARIJ’s trainings 
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were and are not political, ‘our ultimate goal is to teach a new, professional technique that journalists 
can apply to any issue that they deem to be of public concern’.41 In fact, most investigative reports 
that Syrian journalists have published, through ARIJ, have covered issues affecting the lives of the 
Syrian public, like an increase in child sexual abuse, public health risks from environmental waste to 
illnesses due to family inter-marriages or the increase number of women working in the private 
sector with no social insurance. Hattar explained that Syrian journalists have been offered weekly 
trainings, workshops at their headquarters in Amman and one-to-one mentoring and continual 
supervision of investigations.42 In return, those trained had to spend extensive hours on investigative 
fieldwork, which included anything from interviews, archival research and data collection, all of 
which required their steadfastness to overcome bureaucratic obstacles limiting access to 
information. 
ARIJ has been carrying out impressive work that is not just introducing a new type of 
journalism, a novelty in the region, but it is trying the update the Arab educational system, which is 
outdated and which has produced a largely apolitical, a-critical thinking generation. ARIJ has not 
stopped working since the outbreak of the Arab revolts and despite the hardships that the present 
political unrest has brought, investigative journalism seems to be gaining more ground as a tool to 
investigate and disclose recent cases of money laundering, political corruption and organised crime 
(Bajec, 2012).43 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
Remarking upon what was said at the beginning of this article, this study presents a glimpse of 
a sector that is understudied and provides a new tile in the mosaic of the Syrian pre-uprising decade 
and to the many unanswered questions regarding the seeds of the popular revolts.  This study argues 
that the Syrian uprising broke out as an effect of a number of contextual factors, among which the 
expansion of the Syrian media landscape played a dominant role. The growth of the sector resulted 
as an effect of the country’s opening to the new media technologies and to modest institutional 
reforms affecting the sector, but also as a result of foreign aid projects. Media assistance projects 
contributed to the improvement of the media sector, supporting newly established media outlets, 
reforming existing ones, expanding social media use, improving the quality and quantity of news, as 
well as journalists’ professionalism. What is more telling, media development positively affected civil 
society activism, empowering new civil actors in the use of new technologies to push the 
government’s red lines further, to explore the information horizon offered by the Internet and to 
transform the online space in platforms to reclaim their rights and get involved in civil and political 
issues. The effects produced by media assistance projects were most probably beyond the 
implementers’ expectations and the projects’ objectives. Yet, the media aid industry found a 
particular favourable astral moment during the presidency of Bashar al-Asad. In fact, the president 
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had proved to be more inclined to open a dialogue with Western countries, within limits, aware that 
compromise had to be signed in order to avoid an Iraq-style scenario. On the other hand the US 
shifted its strategy from military confrontation to smart means for leverage, among which new media 
occupied a most prominent role.  
Initially, media assistance projects did not produce immediate, far-reaching results. In this 
sense, Maan Adul Salam, the owner of Etana Press – an online portal on women’s issues funded by 
a variety of international organizations – argued that the Internet provided a window to the world, 
but did not make any change at the end (Eisenlohr, Cavatorta, 2012).44 However, the empirical 
evidence from Syria demonstrates how, with time, the cyberspace ‘activated’ citizens, producing an 
important counter-discourse to the regime’s official one. The effect of media assistance aid did not 
reflect on the whole society, but only on a minority directly involved in the media trainings, whether 
as journalists, activists or institutions. However, this minority played a decisive role in connecting 
with ordinary citizens off-line, stimulating civic awareness and political participation and creating a 
fertile terrain that could be exploited for off-line mobilisation at the right time. 
This assertion entails that the West’s foreign aid investment is not driven by development aims 
exclusively, but by broader political aims, among which to destabilize unfriendly regimes account for 
a strategic one. Syria burst into a revolt before this policy was uncovered. However, in countries like 
Cuba, these techniques have been short-lived. The multi-million dollar program of USAID, disguised 
as humanitarian aid, established an anti-regime social-network called ZunZuneo designed to spark 
political dissent. The attempt failed when the authorities discovered about it in early 2014.45 
Interestingly, now that the Cuban and US administration have seen a historic rapprochement, US’s 
attempts to destabilize the Castro’s regime through media development projects, like Radio and TV 
Martì, broadcasting from Miami since the late 80s, are now scrambling to stay relevant as the 
relationship between the two countries is showing signs of improvement.46  
The denial of media assistance programmes by international agencies and Western 
governments does not hold water in Syria, as well as for the rest of the region. The high numbers of 
activists and journalists trained by international organisations are a clear proof of this multifaceted 
strategy. A well-known Tunisian blogger, Ben Gharbia complained in September 2010 about the role 
of Western governments using digital activists to achieve their geopolitical goals and foment unrest. 
He affirmed that Western funding programmes were the ‘kiss of death’ for Arab activists, as their 
anti-regime activities would sooner or later put their life in danger and the support that Western 
governments had offered them would dissipate. As Rolf Paasch of Friedrich Ebert Foundation stated, 
‘I personally find it very problematic to use journalists to drive an agenda. There is a value in 
journalism in and of itself. If I use the media to drive my agenda, the government can do the same. 
It’s actually a bad precedent’ (Alcorn, 2011).47 
Rami Nakhle, a well-known Syrian activist who became one of the spokesmen of the Syrian 
revolution, was able to escape from the pitchfork of the regime and move to Beirut and then off to 
the US.48 Nakhle represents the example of a Syrian activist, who with IT knowledge and curiosity, 
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was trained by a number of media organisations, including the Institute for War and Peace Reporting 
and Freedom House in Syria and abroad (Lebanon, Jordan, US) and who later became a trainer for 
other Syrian activists.49 In his words, his first encounter with the Internet in 2006 and the first 72 
hours he spent surfing the web, represented the ‘crossing of the bridge from darkness to light’, after 
that ‘I started questioning the information I had been fed with at school, on TV, from religious leaders 
and also my family… I realised how we had been brain-washed by the regime’. Nakhle received 
trainings on news writing, social media, digital security and leadership, becoming active in Syria as 
well as in the region, through networks of Arab activists. He later became a trainer himself for other 
Syrian activists and funded the online campaign ‘Get Your Rights’, to help Syrians circumvent 
Internet censorship, which reached 900 followers in 2009 and the ‘Enough Silence Campaign’ that 
called for the lifting of the Emergency Law and the release of political prisoners. As he affirmed, 
every time he would teach another Syrian how to use the Internet and the many possibilities this tool 
offered, another man ‘would cross that bridge from darkness to light and that is the foundation of 
the Arab Spring’. With these words, Nakhle unconsciously said something that echoed one of the 
first speeches of Bashar al-Asad – himself an IT-savvy – when he said, ‘I have always seen the 
problems caused by chaos and corruption, and these problems can be fought with the computer. And 
if you see a computer, you must be organized, and you cannot be chaotic and be good with a 
computer. The technology was created to make things easier and faster, and we need to make things 
easier and faster in this country’ (Eisenlohr, 2011).50 
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